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Abstract: In recent years, neuroscience has begun to transform itself into a “big 
data” enterprise with the importation of computational and statistical techniques 
from machine learning and informatics. In addition to their translational 
applications such as brain-computer interfaces and early diagnosis of 
neuropathology, these tools promise to advance new solutions to longstanding 
theoretical quandaries. Here I critically assess whether these promises will pay 
off, focusing on the application of multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA) to the 
problem of reverse inference. I argue that MVPA does not inherently provide a 
new answer to classical worries about reverse inference, and that the method faces 
pervasive interpretive problems of its own. Further, the epistemic setting of 
MVPA and other decoding methods contributes to a potentially worrisome shift 
towards prediction and away from explanation in fundamental neuroscience. 
 
1. Neuroscience and the data revolution 
From genetics to astronomy and climatology, the sciences now routinely deal with 
extraordinarily large quantitative datasets and deploy computational techniques to manage and 
extract information from them. Neuroscience is no exception to this trend. The quantity and 
kinds of neural data available have shifted radically in the last two decades (Van Horn & Toga, 
2014), a transition striking enough to prompt declarations that “massive data is the new reality in 
neuroscience and medicine” (Bzdok & Yeo, 2017, p. 560). With this shift has come a 
transformation in the analytic tools used to share and process this data, as well as a new wave of 
optimism about the ability of these methods to overcome long-standing theoretical challenges. 
The data revolution has several different fronts. Here I will focus on the impact that 
machine learning (ML) techniques have had on theory and practice in neuroscience. Machine 
learning allows us to efficiently partition complex datasets, make inferences, conduct searches, 
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and extract hidden patterns.1 In the following discussion I sketch one way that machine learning 
has transformed neuroscientific practice, namely through the application of data analytic tools to 
imaging studies. One such application is in the use of multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA) to 
uncover neural structure. MVPA-based methods have proliferated since their introduction in 
studies of visual processing (Haxby, 2001). However, it is by no means clear how best to 
interpret the outputs of the increasingly complicated machine learning algorithms that lie at the 
heart of these methods. 
My aim in this chapter is twofold. First, I argue that MVPA does not provide a new 
solution to the longstanding problem of reverse inference, a claim that has been advanced by 
Guillermo del Pinal and Marco Nathan in several papers (Del Pinal & Nathan, 2017; Nathan & 
Del Pinal, 2017), and that also comports with the interpretation of MVPA presupposed by many 
prominent studies. If MVPA enabled us to break new ground in overcoming the challenges of 
reverse inference, this would be a powerful argument in favor of multivariate studies over 
traditional mass-univariate approaches. I present three interpretive challenges that cast doubt on 
the claim that MVPA can singlehandedly resolve the reserve inference debate. These challenges 
center on these techniques’ sensitivity and globality, the instability of their results, and their 
agnosticism with respect to causal structure.  
Second, I want to sound a cautionary note about these new tools and statistical 
techniques. Such technologies are not ideologically neutral. They come with certain preferred 
uses, as well as a specific deployment of rhetoric which they carry over from their original 
computational contexts to their neuroscientific applications. With respect to machine learning, 
                                                          
1 Much recent work using machine learning in neuroscience has centered on deep convolutional neural networks 
(DCNNs). DCNNs are substantially different from the kinds of models I will discuss here, so I omit further 
discussion of them. 
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the key term often involved is prediction. Indeed, some neuroscientists have explicitly begun to 
couch their epistemic aims in terms not of explanation or understanding, but of greater predictive 
accuracy. While this may not yet be the prevalent view among practitioners, I suggest that in 
light of the ease with which machine learning tools can be turned to purely predictive ends we 
should be cautious about interpreting models that are based on them, and conscious about the 
subtle effects they may be having on the studies we design and the epistemic aims that we adopt. 
Prediction and explanation need not inherently be in conflict with one another, and neuroscience 
should develop multifaceted modeling practices that integrate these goals rather than favoring 
one over the other. 
 
2. Two forms of reverse inference: Functional and predictive 
The ultimate aim of cognitive neuroscience and neuropsychology is to construct interfield 
theories bridging brain and mind. Ideally, such bridges would comprise an explanatory 
implementation theory that would make it comprehensible how and why specific patterns of 
brain activity realize the cognitive processes that they do. Explaining the neural basis of 
cognition requires an account of how low-level neural processes give rise to specific cognitive 
functions, spelled out in terms of their causal capacities and organization. Most acknowledge that 
this is at present a utopian prospect. A more modest goal would be to make neuroscientific data 
evidentially relevant to determining the structure of cognition. Debate has raged, however, over 
how optimistic we should be even about this goal, with skeptics such as Max Coltheart (2006, 
2013) doubting whether neural evidence could ever be sufficient to distinguish between 
competing psychological models. 
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Building interfield theories and bringing neural evidence to bear in psychology requires a 
reliable inferential framework capable of crossing ontological, epistemic, and methodological 
boundaries. Here I focus on one facet of this framework, namely reverse inference.2 Reverse 
inferences move from the fact that neural process N occurs to the conclusion that (with some 
probability) cognitive process C is engaged (Poldrack, 2006). Reverse inferences hold when N’s 
activation provides sufficient evidence for C, to the exclusion of other cognitive processes that 
might be taking place. For instance, suppose (1) that activity in Broca’s area makes it probable 
that processing of sequentially structured information is taking place, (2) that this processing is 
unlikely to be taking place in the absence of this underlying activity, (3) that no other regional 
neural activity is evidence for this form of sequence processing, and (4) that activity in this area 
is not strong evidence for the engagement of any other type of cognitive process. Knowing these 
facts, we can use such activation to conclude that a novel experimental task that activates 
Broca’s area involves sequential processing, which may help to decide between two different 
psychological models of how it is performed. 
The present impasse over reverse inference centers how to respond to the comprehensive 
failure of functional localization for many cognitive processes of interest. Localization is the 
claim that particular cognitive processes are realized by neuroanatomically circumscribed brain 
regions that are relatively small and functionally dedicated. It has increasingly become clear that 
many, perhaps most, brain regions seem to participate to some degree in several different 
cognitive processes (Anderson, 2014; Rathkopf, 2013; Weiskopf, 2016). So from the fact that a 
pattern N occurs there is some probability that at least one of the processes C1, C2, …, Cn is 
                                                          
2 Its other face, forward inference, involves moving in the opposite direction, viz. from the engagement of a 
cognitive process to the fact that a specific neural process is occurring (Henson, 2006). For discussion of forward 
inferences in the context of dissociation studies rather than imaging contexts, see Davies (2010). 
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being engaged. From this probability distribution we can’t conclude that any one of them, to the 
exclusion of all others, is localized in N. Given that some regions are involved in a wildly 
heterogeneous-seeming array of activities across many domains, it is hard to conclude that 
realizing any one of them is that region’s determinate and unique function.  
A number of strategies have been proposed to deal with the problem of reverse inference 
under conditions of functional heterogeneity (Burnston, 2016a; Glymour & Hanson, 2016; 
Hutzler, 2014; Klein, 2012; Machery, 2014; McCaffrey, 2015; Roskies, 2009). Rather than 
survey all of these here, I will consider a recent proposal to solve the problem by applying 
machine learning techniques to imaging data. 
First, though, we should distinguish two purposes for which one may seek out reverse 
inferences. Call these functional reverse inference and predictive reverse inference. A functional 
reverse inference involves two claims: that activity in N indicates engagement of C, and that this 
relationship holds because the function of N is to realize C.3 Functional RI is distinguished by 
the fact that it incorporates a justification for why the inferential relationship is reliable. It is not 
merely an accidental-but-reliable co-occurrence: the neural process or region that is active is one 
that has a certain assigned cognitive function. Having such a function imposes highly specific 
requirements on the causal organization of the underlying region, namely that it be capable of 
underwriting the pattern of effects that characterize the target cognitive process. This constraint 
in turn secures an explanatory connection between what is happening in N and C’s engagement. 
                                                          
3 Alternately, the second claim can be formulated in mechanistic terms: the neural mechanism involved in N has the 
function of realizing or implementing cognitive process C. I won’t make any assumptions here about whether all 
realizing structures for cognitive processes are mechanistic. 
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Seeking out functional RIs such as these is essential to fleshing out the sort of interfield theory 
sketched earlier. 
Predictive RI, by contrast, merely says that activity in N indicates a certain probability of 
engagement of C. Its focus is on finding reliable indicators of cognition, no matter what the 
function of those markers is within the mind/brain system. These might be thought of as 
“cognitive biomarkers”. In medicine, a biomarker is any detectable biological signature that is 
correlated either with the presence or progression of a disorder. Examples include hemoglobin 
A1C levels for diabetes or the BRCA1 gene for breast cancer. Biomarkers are sometimes linked 
directly with the underlying causal factors that drive a disorder, but often may reflect effects or 
other secondary processes that are restricted to their clinical or prognostic utility. 
By analogy, neural activity in a region understood as a cognitive biomarker can serve 
predictive RI perfectly well, despite not being apt for functional RI. The reason is that this 
activity can be exploited to predict cognitive processing even when it is not what realizes that 
processing. For instance, the “ground truth” might be that N1 realizes C, but N1 might also 
reliably co-occur with N2—either because N1 and N2 are directly causally related (e.g., N1 causes 
N2), or because they are common effects of a distinct cause. Here both N1 and N2 would be 
equally suited for predictive RI, but not equally good for functional RI. The grounds for 
predicting cognitive processing differ from those that explain it. 
Functional and predictive RI are distinguished in terms of the purposes or goals that lie 
behind them. This is not to deny that they may work together in many contexts. There is no 
contradiction between gathering information about brain-mind correlations for the purpose of 
finding realizers and seeking such correlations for the aim of finding strongly predictive neural 
signatures. Nevertheless, they can also be pursued exclusively, and prescribe different programs 
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of experimental interventions, interpretation of evidence, and statistical analysis. A neural 
signature of deception, for instance, might be highly predictive and legally probative without 
tracking the neural implementation of the intent to deceive. Theorists have not always been 
explicit on which conception of reverse inference is at issue, although most of the debate over 
bringing neuroscientific evidence to bear on cognitive theories has tacitly assumed a functional 
conception of RI. Carefully observing this distinction becomes especially important with the 
recent turn to machine learning methods, because the rhetoric of decoding, and the striking 
success of ML classifiers on prediction tasks, has begun to drive some neuroscientists towards 
abandoning explanation in favor of prediction. It is not an accident that the rise of decoding 
methods in neuroscience has coincided with the more general adoption of predictive machine 
learning tools in science, medicine, industry, and marketing (see, e.g., Agrawal, Gans, & 
Goldfarb, 2018).  
Proponents of this “predictive turn” argue that it injects much needed rigor into 
neuroscience and psychology. They correctly point out that these fields have disappointing track 
records of real-world prediction. The traditional significance tests they frequently use are hard to 
interpret in predictive terms, and merely fitting statistical models to existing datasets often leaves 
us unable generate any useful forecasts. These shortcomings have also been obscured to some 
degree by the focus of recent philosophy of science on questions concerning explanation, to the 
exclusion of prediction.4  
The extent to which the predictive turn is becoming more prominent in neuroscience at 
large is hard to measure given the size and diversity of the field. Nevertheless, passages such as 
                                                          
4 There are some notable exceptions to this. For instance, Douglas (2009) argues that despite the philosophical 
neglect of prediction, it remains central to defining the scientific enterprise, and Northcott (2017) points out that in 
many domains such as political polling, prediction is often a more desirable epistemic trait than understanding.  
8 
 
the following, drawn from position papers by major participants in the debate, represent a few 
straws in the wind: 
 
“Perhaps the biggest benefits of a prediction oriented within psychology are likely to be 
realized when psychologists start asking research questions that are naturally amenable to 
predictive analysis. Doing so requires setting aside, at least some of the time, deeply 
ingrained preoccupations with identifying the underlying causal mechanisms that are 
mostly likely to have given rise to some data.” (Yarkoni & Westfall, 2017, p. 18) 
 
“Isolating components of mental processing leads to studying them only via oppositions, 
and this reductionism prevents the building of broad theories of the mind. We believe that 
predictive modeling provides new tools to tackle this formidable task” (Varoquaux & 
Poldrack, 2019, p. 1)  
 
“the main goal of the prediction enterprise is to put the built model, with already 
estimated model parameters, to the test against some independent data… she [the 
investigator] is not necessarily worrying about how the model works or whether its fitted 
parameters carry biological insight” (Bzdok & Ioannidis, 2019, p. 3) 
 
The thrust of these passages is clear: prediction should be given at least equal (if not greater) 
epistemic weight as explanation in modeling cognitive and neural phenomena. 
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Of course, these are merely three papers that stake out their high-level methodological 
claims relatively quickly. For another indicator of prediction’s rise, consider the rapidly growing 
field of neuroforecasting, the explicit goal of which is to find neural signals that predict 
individual, group, or society-wide behaviors, attitudes, and trends (Berkman & Falk, 2013). In 
some representative studies, activity in medial prefrontal regions of individual smokers exposed 
to antismoking public health messages has been said to predict the population-level success of 
those campaigns (Falk, Berkman, & Lieberman, 2012), and nucleus accumbens activation has 
been singled out as a predictor of aggregate success of crowdfunded projects on the Internet 
(Genevsky, Yoon, & Knutson, 2017). Often these neural predictors outperform behaviors or 
expressed attitudes, which makes them especially attractive targets for marketing purposes. 
To the extent that there is a move towards predictively oriented studies taking place, this 
may in part be an effect of the new tools that neuroscientists have at their disposal. The 
predictive turn is a concomitant of the adoption of techniques from machine learning. Since these 
tools have a natural epistemic habitat in data science tasks where computationally efficient 
prediction is the goal, they tend to carry aspects of this habitat with them when they take root in 
new domains.  
 
3. Decoding the mind with multivariate pattern analysis 
Much of the excitement surrounding the use of machine learning in neuroscience is that it 
offers the possibility of decoding brain activity, a process that its advocates often colorfully refer 
to as “reading” the mind off of the brain (Norman, Polyn, Detre, & Haxby, 2006; Poldrack, 
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2018).5 In a typical decoding experiment, participants perform a set of tasks during a data 
collection phase. In principle any sort of data can serve as input to a decoding process (EEG, 
MEG, direct electrode recordings, etc.), but I will focus on functional MRI studies. Participants 
are scanned while performing tasks that are typically selected for their differences in the 
information and the processes that they draw on.6 
The data from these tasks consists of a vector of numbers measuring the change in the 
BOLD signal at each voxel at each time step of the scanning sequence. In a procedure known as 
cross-classification validation, each input sequence is labeled according to the task or stimulus 
condition that it was gathered in (with labels just being binary features), and the data is separated 
into two piles: a training set and a test set. Typically, data from one subject is reserved for 
testing.7 The labeled training sequences are then fed into a supervised machine learning 
classifier. Depending on the voxel parcellation scheme used, these vectors may include 10,000-
50,000 features, and a given time sequence may include a dozen vectors, meaning that classifiers 
are dealing with upwards of hundreds of thousands of inputs per participant. 
There are many possible classifiers to use in MVPA studies. While these differ in their 
technical details, the same points apply to many of them. To streamline discussion, I will focus 
                                                          
5 The mindreading rhetoric is handled cagily in the literature. For instance, despite his book’s title, Poldrack hedges 
on the aptness of the “reading” metaphor, referring to it as “audacious” at one point (p. 2). Others have been less 
cautious: Haynes et al. (2007) explicitly refer to “reading intentions” out from brain activity, and in a review essay 
Haynes (2012) remarks that thanks to “combining fMRI with pattern recognition” it “has been possible to read 
increasingly detailed contents of a person’s thoughts” (p. 30). He later comments that in practice this form of 
mindreading will likely be most useful with respect to broad categories of mental states such as the intent to deceive. 
Finally, Tong & Pratte (2012) helpfully distinguish between “brain reading” and “mind reading”, where the former 
refers to predicting overt or observable behaviors from brain activity, while the latter refers to predicting subjective 
cognitive states. They regard MVPA methods as having contributed to progress in both (pp. 485-6). 
6 Many contemporary studies also use naturalistic tasks (e.g., movie watching) that engage more widespread 
cognitive processes. For more details on experimental design, see Tong & Pratte (2012), Haxby, Connolly & 
Guntupalli (2014), and Haynes (2015). 
7 There is reason to think that these prevalent leave-k-out training regimes aren’t adequately variance-minimizing, 
however; see Varoquaux et al. (2017), who recommend leaving out 10-20% of the data and using repeated random 
splits. Because of the relative youth of these paradigms, best experimental practices are still stabilizing.  
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on a single commonly used example, namely support vector machines (SVM). SVMs efficiently 
learn to assign each voxel a weight according to how well its activity can help to predict the 
target category. In linear SVMs, each voxel is assigned a positive or negative weight according 
to its contribution to correct labeling. The SVM’s goal is to draw an optimal hyperplane in voxel 
(feature) space partitioning the space of possible activity patterns into regions corresponding to 
each label. There are usually many linear partitions available, but optimality means that the 
hyperplane maximizes the margin from itself to the nearest members of each category. These 
borderline, hardest-to-classify items are the “support vectors”. Data sets that cannot be linearly 
partitioned in their raw form can be transformed using kernel methods into spaces where such 
partitioning is possible.8 
The weight vector w is defined by the equation: 
𝑤𝑇𝑥 + 𝑏 = 0 
where x is drawn from the set of training vectors and b is a bias term. The weight vector drives 
the SVM’s behavior in accordance with a decision rule that classifies new inputs as +1 or –1 
depending on which side of the margin they fall on. Once an SVM learns to achieve an optimal 
degree of separation with the training set, its weights are frozen and its performance is judged by 
how well it classifies members of the unseen test set (out-of-sample transfer). Decoding, then, is 
defined as a classifier’s performing adequately well at inferring from neural data to a category 
                                                          
8 Most neuroimaging studies use the standard linear kernel. Higher-order relationships among voxels are considered 
only in nonlinear classifiers, including so-called “deep” neural networks. Since almost everyone considers these too 
powerful and unconstrained for use with imaging data, I continue to omit them here. 
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label standing for something extra-neural, e.g., a perceptual stimulus, a behavioral response, a 
task condition, or a cognitive process.9 
This decoding paradigm can be illustrated by Kamitani & Tong’s (2005) landmark study 
of visual attention. Participants were initially scanned while viewing gratings oriented at either 
45o or 135o, and the resulting images were used to train a classifier on voxels selected from 
regions V1-V4. They were then shown a grating that superimposed both of the previous ones and 
asked to direct their attention selectively to one or another of the orientations. The data from the 
second phase was fed into the classifier trained on the first phase, which was able to discriminate 
between the two attention conditions with nearly 80% accuracy. They concluded that 
information about a participant’s attentional state can be decoded from activity in visual cortex. 
As Varoquaux & Poldrack (2019) emphasize, classifiers’ “validity is established by 
successful predictions from new data, and not by isolating significant differences across 
observations” (p. 2). In this sense the statistical regime that underlies MVPA is fundamentally 
different from that of mass univariate analysis. It focuses not primarily on detection of univariate 
statistical differences in activation patterns, but on extracting predictive information—in any 
form whatsoever—from distributed neural activity (Hebart & Baker, 2018). The epistemic 
regime of prediction is therefore entwined with MVPA at a fundamental level. 
Machine learning applied to neural data has proven fruitful across many practical 
domains. Examples include classifying patients into neuropsychiatric groups on the basis of 
                                                          
9 Encoding, by contrast, involves the reverse operation: training classifiers to predict measurements of neural 
activation given an experimental task, condition, or stimulus input. Note that the encoding/decoding distinction has 
to do with the direction of inference relative to available neural data. In either direction, it is couched in terms of the 
measured information made available. Further inferences are required to move from this data to conclusions about 
content or actual neural ground truths. The encoding/decoding distinction also shouldn’t be confused with direction 
of causality. Both decoding and encoding are predictive modeling techniques that can be applied to experimental 
setups in which neural activity is either the cause or effect of the state being predicted.  
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resting scans, diagnosis of neuropathological conditions by biomarkers rather than symptoms, 
creating brain-computer interfaces and other neuroprosthetics, extracting the contents of ongoing 
visual perception, and detection of consciousness in unresponsive patients. The success of these 
clinical and translational applications is more than enough to justify the interest in solving more 
fundamental theoretical problems using the same analytic toolkit. 
 
4. Decoding as a solution to reverse inference 
In experimental setups where what is being decoded is the occurrence of a cognitive 
process (rather than, say, the presence of a disorder), decoding can be interpreted as the use of 
classifiers to perform reverse inference tasks. It is a very short step from (1) MVPA reveals that 
information about mental states can be extracted from measured brain activity to (2) MVPA can 
be used to infer the occurrence of mental states on the basis of measured brain activity. In several 
papers, Guillermo del Pinal and Marco Nathan have taken this step. They argue that MVPA 
provides a new solution to the problem of reverse inference (Del Pinal & Nathan, 2017; Nathan 
& Del Pinal, 2017). They call this pattern-based reverse inference, by contrast with classical 
location-based reverse inference. 
Their central argument for preferring MVPA to location-based approaches rests on the 
fact that classifier-based studies satisfy what they call the linking condition (Del Pinal & Nathan, 
2017, p. 129). Suppose we want to know whether a task-evoked pattern of neural activity N 
engages C1 or C2. To do so requires independent evidence that N is positively linked with, say, 
C1 (rather than C2). In traditional univariate analysis this evidence is precisely what is missing, 
thanks to the multifunctionality of regions across studies (see Section 2). However, MVPA 
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involves training classifiers on data gathered within phases of the same experiment, rather than 
making comparisons across experiments. It therefore circumvents the problem by directly 
comparing activation patterns, where the reliability with which these patterns are distinguishable 
is determined within the experiment (pp. 135-6). Moreover, MVPA does this without importing 
any problematic assumptions either about the localization of cognitive processes in brain regions, 
or about the previously established cognitive functions of those regions.  
From these points we can extract the following methodological prescription concerning 
the utility of decoding for cognitive difference: 
(DCD): If a decoder can be trained to distinguish neural patterns elicited by two tasks, 
then the tasks involve different cognitive processes. 
DCD relies on the principle that any differences in cognitive processing will be reflected in their 
underlying neural realization, so no two processes can have (within an individual performing a 
specific task) the same realization. 
While del Pinal and Nathan do not explicitly state the DCD principle, some version of it 
is implicit in their arguments. It can also be seen as tacitly driving the interpretation of a number 
of imaging studies. Varoquaux & Thirion (2014), for instance, propose that decoding provides a 
“principled methodological framework for reverse inferences” (p. 4), where the latter are 
understood in the functional sense. Moreover, DCD-like principles aren’t confined to the pages 
of theoretical papers. Consider studies of visual perception such as Haynes & Rees (2005), in 
which participants simultaneously viewed two stimuli designed to induce binocular rivalry while 
indicating via button-pressing which of the two they were experiencing at a particular moment. 
A pattern classifier was trained on activity in 50 voxels of V1 and used to predict the timing with 
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which one or the other visual stimulus became conscious, achieving an 80% success rate. In a 
separate condition, a classifier trained to distinguish presentations of monocular non-rivalrous 
stimuli could predict binocular switching similarly well. Haynes & Rees conclude that “[their] 
data could be taken to represent a simple form of ‘mind reading,’ in which brain responses were 
sufficient to predict dynamic changes in conscious perception in the absence of any behavioral 
clues” (p. 1302). That is, they interpret this study’s methods as licensing an inference from 
accurate machine classification of neural patterns to changes in people’s perceptual states. 
Similar inferences crop up in studies of pain perception. In one widely cited study, Wager 
et al. (2013) subjected participants to thermal stimuli varying from warm to painful. These 
stimuli were both classified and rated according to intensity on a 100-point scale. A sparse 
pattern classifier (see Section 4.2 below) was trained on a map of anatomical regions preselected 
for their known involvement in pain processing, and this classifier was tested on scans of neural 
activity during the stimulation period. The classifier was used to generate predictions of how the 
stimulus was experienced, and to predict its intensity.10 It was able to discriminate painful from 
nonpainful conditions with 93% specificity and sensitivity, and to predict pain intensity well 
(although warmth intensity was less successfully captured). These results, among others, lead 
them to conclude that the ROIs driving classifier performance constitute a “neurologic signature” 
(p. 1396) or biomarker of subjective pain experience. This again is consistent with DCD, since 
biomarker regions (as determined by classifier weight assignments) are singled out for their role 
in predicting participants’ experiential reports, which are assumed to reflect their phenomenal 
                                                          
10 These predictions were calculated in terms of a “signature response”, here defined as the dot product of the trained 
classifier weights and the activation map for each temperature within participants (see p. 1391 and the 
Supplementary Materials). Signature response was used in two ways: to directly predict rated intensity of a stimulus, 
and with an imposed threshold to predict pain/no pain.  
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state. The logic of this study is representative of that presented in a recent survey and critique of 
the pain prediction literature by Hu & Iannetti (2016).11 
Finally, moving from experiential states to cognitive ones, DCD also drives studies aimed 
at predicting intentions to act. Soon, He, Bode, & Haynes (2013) trained classifiers to find 
regions that are predictive of conscious decisions to carry out abstract actions (in this case, 
adding or subtracting single digit numbers). Participants viewed a sequence of slides containing a 
matrix of numbers plus a single letter cue, and were free to choose at any time to either add or 
subtract the numbers. After indicating readiness and carrying out the arithmetic operation, they 
reported the result along with which letter was present when they became aware of their 
decision. Classifiers were trained on scans from the 8-18 seconds preceding their awareness, 
with the aim of distinguishing between the operations that later they carried out. At 4 seconds 
prior to awareness of the intention, two regions were able to successfully decode (with 59% 
accuracy) which type of mental arithmetic the participants carried out. This decoding success 
was interpreted as evidence for the presence of an unconscious intention to execute a mental 
action. In their discussion section, they say: “Our results show that regions of medial frontopolar 
cortex and posterior cingulate/precuneus encode freely chosen abstract intentions before the 
decisions have been consciously made” (p. 6219). An additional explicit invocation of a DCD-
like principle occurs in their methods section, where they note that “[g]ood classification implied 
that the local cluster of voxels spatially encoded information about the participant’s specific 
current intention” (p. 6221).  
                                                          
11 This review also distinguishes between two objectives in decoding: discovering a pain-specific neural signature 
and discovering a reliable pain predictor. This approximately corresponds to the distinction drawn here between 
functional and predictive RI. As the authors note, these two goals prescribe distinct experimental and statistical 
logics and should be more cleanly separated in practice. 
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These examples suggest that DCD-style inference is employed across a number of 
domains in contemporary imaging studies. Nevertheless, I argue we should reject the claim that 
decodability of differences between tasks is sufficient to reveal cognitive differences. Classifiers 
are powerful tools, but they often achieve their results for reasons that are opaque or flat out in 
conflict with the wider epistemic purposes that drive the debate over reverse inference. In the 
following sections I survey three problems that plague the interpretation of decoding results. The 
picture that emerges is one on which even when they can attain a high degree of predictive 
success, we may not be able to confidently infer from this fact to either ground truths about 
neural functioning or to facts about cognitive processing. 
 
4.1. The problem of sensitivity and globality  
Two core traits for which classifiers are touted are their high degree of sensitivity to 
neural activity and their globality, meaning that in making predictions they inherently take into 
account spatially distributed voxel patterns. Del Pinal and Nathan specifically cite globality as a 
virtue when they note that MVPA does not rely on assumptions about localization of cognitive 
functions in the brain. But both of these traits can lead to scenarios in which labeled patterns are 
distinguished with high accuracy without this necessarily being a sign that different cognitive 
processes are engaged. In short, classifiers can be oversensitive relative to our interest in reverse 
inference. As a result, we cannot treat weight vectors as direct measures of the underlying signal 
that voxels contain. 
To see this, consider the factors that account for high sensitivity. SVMs may assign 
certain clusters of voxels individually decisive weights in driving predictions. However, 
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selectively deleting or zeroing out these weights does not necessarily result in the classifier’s 
performance collapsing. The reason is that while the remaining weights are individually only 
weak predictors, when taken together they are enough to succeed at the task. It is possible to use 
an array of weak voxel cues to predict the target category if they are sufficiently well correlated. 
And neural activity, particularly in adjacent voxels of neuroanatomically related regions, is often 
correlated, so it isn’t unlikely that regions will contain many such co-occurring predictors.  
A common assumption of MVPA is that this form of pattern sensitivity is evidence for a 
highly distributed neural code, with task-relevant information being encoded by subtle activation 
differences within and across regions (Kragel, Koban, Barrett, & Wager, 2018).12 From this 
perspective the globality of classifiers is a virtue, since it meshes appropriately with the structure 
of the underlying neural vehicles. This interpretation presumes that a voxel’s making a 
contribution to successful classification indicates that it is a causally significant part of the 
encoding of content or the realization of a cognitive process—in other words, that we can read 
off significant aspects of the ground truths from properties of the classifier weight vector. 
There are cases, though, where classifiers are picking up on information that we have 
strong reasons to think is irrelevant to the task. For example, regions of motor cortex frequently 
show distinctive activity across task contexts, due to the demands of the specific responses each 
task requires. A classifier might assign these some predictive value, without their being relevant 
to the “core” cognitive processes of interest (Jimura & Poldrack, 2012, p. 550). Indeed, in one 
                                                          
12 However, despite the fact that it remains common to see successful applications of MVPA described in terms of 
distributed neural representations, it has been shown that we cannot infer from the dimensionality of the 
measurements to that of the underlying neural code itself. Linear classifiers will use any number of voxel features 
that they are trained on, but this does not establish that the brain itself encodes this information in this way (Davis et 
al., 2014). For a real-world example, single electrode studies can recover information about face identity in macaque 
visual cortex, but this information cannot be decoded with MVPA, plausibly because of weak clustering of 
similarly-responding neurons (Dubois, de Berker, & Tsao, 2015). 
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often-cited study dozens of cortical regions isolated using searchlight analysis could support 
successful classification between 30 and 50% of the time (Poldrack, Halchenko, & Hanson, 
2009). Cases like these show that a neural pattern can be useful for distinguishing the 
engagement of two processes without being the realizer of either. 
One response to this problem is to be more selective about the regions that are used to 
train and test classifiers. This is the intuition behind techniques such as ROI-based masking and 
searchlight analysis (Kriegeskorte, Goebel, & Bandettini, 2006). If motor processes are not 
thought to be functionally relevant, voxels in motor cortex should be stripped out by deleting 
them from the input vectors prior to classifier training. I will discuss these sparsity-oriented 
strategies in the next section. But while a priori selection of ROIs can remove regions that are 
believed to be irrelevant to the cognitive processing that we are interested in, this solution 
doesn’t generalize. Sometimes the information that classifiers exploit is present in regions that 
we are interested in, and so it can’t be successfully stripped out. For example, regions of primary 
visual cortex contribute to discrimination of high level visual features despite the fact that we 
don’t have strong reasons to think that they actually compute using the information that can be 
decoded from them (Cox & Savoy, 2003). Decoders’ sensitivity to available information within 
ROIs can easily outstrip the ground truths about whether and how that information is causally 
used (de-Wit, Alexander, Ekroll, & Wagemans, 2016; Ritchie, Kaplan, & Klein, 2019). 
It is, in fact, an open possibility that classifier weights may be assigned to voxels that are 
not the origin of the underlying neural signal, and that low (or even negative) weights may be 
assigned to voxels where the signal is located.13 To take one example of this phenomenon, 
                                                          
13 A related warning is that positive weights on a voxel can reflect decreases in its activation, since if these 
decreases are reliable they may convey information about certain stimulus conditions. This just reiterates the 
interpretive point that weight maps projected onto voxel space are not the same as mass-univariate activation maps. 
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suppose that we have BOLD measurements from two regions, and that the ground truth is that 
one of these regions contains information that can discriminate moderately well between two 
labeled conditions, while the other contains no such information. Nevertheless, the weight vector 
to achieve optimal discrimination can (under the right circumstances) be one that assigns double 
the weight to the latter region than to the former—despite the fact that the latter region is by 
hypothesis one that is informationally empty (Haufe et al., 2014).14 
This idealized case illustrates two broader points about MVPA: first, it runs together 
signal and noise, treating both as potential information; and second, it assigns weights based not 
on individual voxel importance but on how well overall classification performance is affected. 
Classifiers are holistic and opportunistic. For example, two voxels that contain no genuine 
information about which condition obtains can nevertheless be used for discrimination if they 
have different noise variances in each condition (Hebart & Baker, 2018). So weight assignments 
are at least sometimes performed on grounds other than the causal-explanatory significance of 
voxel activity. 
What this implies with respect to the reverse inference debate is that one can’t conclude 
from the fact that a successful classifier assigns a certain weight to a voxel that the voxel’s 
activity contains a signal whose function is realizing the cognitive operation that is being 
decoded. Weight maps should not be read as transparent guides to the neural sources of cognition 
and behavior. Rather, weights are assigned for the purpose of maximizing overall success using 
                                                          
14 This artificial example has been criticized by Schrouff & Mourão-Miranda (2018), who argue that it holds only 
for low signal-to-noise ratio cases. However, given that it is often unclear what the SNR is for particular ROIs, it is 
fair to say we cannot across the board rule out the presence of “false positive” voxel weights. Moreover, the type of 
noise matters. As Haufe et al. point out, it is sometimes possible to correct for the presence of Gaussian noise to 
recover underlying signal, but this doesn’t hold for noise induced by scanner drift, head motion, and periodic noise 
(P. K. Douglas & Anderson, 2017), all of which are present in imaging data. 
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any available cues. As Haufe et al. note: “A widespread misconception about multivariate 
classifier weights is that (the brain regions corresponding to) measurement channels with large 
weights are strongly related to the experimental condition” (Haufe et al., 2014, p. 97). This fact 
can be often be obscured by visualizations that depict them as being similar to more familiar 
univariate activity maps, and by the common practice of comparing anatomical regions with high 
classifier weights to regions with high activation levels as revealed in univariate experiments.  
It is certainly defensible for some translational purposes to focus just on decoding 
success—perhaps engineering brain-computer interfaces or clinical diagnosis are examples. 
However, doing so involves privileging predictive RI over functional RI. This carries the risk 
that our models are ignoring potentially explanatory ground truths. Insofar as a model is 
insensitive to such truths, we should not treat it as directly illuminating cognitive processing.  
 
4.2. The problem of stability and tradeoffs 
The previous point can be amplified further. Even when classifiers can distinguish 
between task states, increased prediction accuracy per se does not guarantee other epistemically 
desirable properties. Here the problem lies in the fact that what is decoded depends in part on the 
specific modeling choices made by experimenters. Because classifier performance turns on 
model selection and tuning of parameters, it embodies certain familiar trade-offs. In particular 
there is a tension between the stability of the weights and the performance of the classifier 
(Baldassarre, Pontil, & Mourão-Miranda, 2017; Rasmussen, Hansen, Madsen, Churchill, & 
Strother, 2012; Varoquaux et al., 2017). Stability is a measure of how reliably the same weight 
pattern will be reproduced by different classifiers, or by different runs of the same classifier. 
22 
 
Machine learning research has increasingly focused on the quantifying these tradeoffs, and one 
consistent result that emerges from these studies is that if we choose parameter assignments that 
maximize the predictive success of a classifier, we are necessarily sacrificing other potentially 
important properties.  
A typical linear classifier like SVM has a soft margin parameter that determines how 
much misclassifications are counted against a weight assignment.15 Sparse classifiers include 
various regularization terms, which impose parsimony constraints (degree of fit to the data, 
contiguity, smoothness, etc.) on the resulting weights. These classifiers are used to select only 
some of the possible input features to drive the weight vector, but a great deal turns on exactly 
how these parameters are tuned. In one study, Rasmussen et al. (2012) found that as the 
regularization parameter is varied, predictive accuracy decreases (from ~72% to 50% correct) 
while pattern reproducibility as measured by Pearson’s correlation increases (from 0.0 to 0.5). 
More accurate prediction, in other words, is purchased at the cost of high variability in the spatial 
weight map. This implies that credit assigned to one region could be revoked if the same 
classifier were retrained without alteration. 
The tradeoff for a model’s high degree of success, then, is a lack of reliable 
informativeness about what regions are most responsible for that success. This has obvious 
consequences for the interpretation of classifier performance. These types of tradeoffs apply 
even within the domain of sparse classifiers, which attempt to group weights into relatively few 
                                                          
15 The choice of kernel is also significant, but many neuroimaging applications use a linear kernel, so I ignore this 
complication here. The number of available off-the-shelf classifiers plus the number of tunable parameters for each 
gives rise to serious, but often unaddressed, problems. Specifically, the choice of any particular model-parameter 
pairing in imaging studies is often undermotivated. We should be cautious about interpreting results where the 
choice of data analysis methods is largely unconstrained (except by experimenter preference), and where these 
choices make a large difference to the outcome. This is the moral of Andrew Gelman’s “garden of forking paths”. 
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internally homogeneous or structurally adjacent clusters. In a comparison across six sparse 
models trained on fMRI datasets, systematic accuracy-stability tradeoffs arise for each one 
(Baldassarre et al., 2017). A typical sparse classifier such as LASSO can achieve high accuracy 
(85%) at a corrected overlap score of just under 0.6, while a higher overlap score (around 0.7) 
returns much worse accuracy (~65%). 
If predictive accuracy is all that we care about, it is clear which parameter tuning we 
should prefer. But in practice, modelers often prefer sparse solutions. What sparseness costs in 
predictive accuracy it purportedly gains in making models more interpretable and biologically 
plausible. A non-sparse model can assign decoding importance to a scattered, buckshot-like 
distribution of regions that lacks any neurophysiological sense. Even sparse models are not 
interpretively transparent, though. While the best-performing sparse classifiers converged in 
assigning the same five regions the highest weight (although not in the same order), they still 
varied widely in how many regions they included overall (from 10 to 106 total). Human-legible 
interpretation remains challenging with dozens of small, anatomically insignificant regions 
participating. 
But why should the interpretability of models matter from a perspective such as that of 
DCD, where the express goal of decoding is simply to find evidence that decides between two 
possible cognitive models? Given del Pinal and Nathan’s emphasis on the fact that MVPA does 
not depend on any specific localizationist assignment of functions to regions, prioritizing 
sparseness at all might seem beside the point. DCD as a criterion of reverse inference cares only 
about predictive success, not other epistemic traits of models. Once we no longer seek to map 
cognitive functions onto regions in a way that respects their underlying causal organization, there 
is no added evidential value in the mere fact that a weight map is sparsely interpretable. 
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For these purposes, decoding that is based on an unstable weight map or one that is hard 
to interpret may be adequate. A more traditional concern for functional RI might lead us to have 
a different set of goals in mind, however, including the desire to explain how neural patterns 
realize cognitive processes. For these goals, interpretability and plausibility matter. Focusing 
attention on a sparse subset of regions is best understood as motivated by a search for neural 
structures that play the appropriate causal-explanatory roles. As we will see, though, even this 
goal often proves elusive. 
 
4.3. The problem of causality 
Suppose a classifier achieves what we regard as a good balance of accuracy and 
production of a reproducible, sparse, reasonably plausible weight map. It is tempting to infer 
from such success to claims about causality and processing. For instance, Kriegeskorte and 
Douglas (2019) propose that classifiers can perform double duty as causal models: “if a decoder 
is used to predict behavioral responses, for example judgments of categorization or continuous 
stimulus variables… then the decoder can be interpreted as a model (at a high level of 
abstraction) of the brain computations generating the behavioral responses from the encoding of 
the stimuli in the decoded brain region” (p. 171).  
However, decoders do not give us enough evidence to conclude that the predictively 
weighted regions cause behavioral effects. There are several reasons for this. One is that 
decoders have no inherent causal directionality built into them. Procedures to find the best 
boundary to enable pattern-to-label associations are agnostic on whether there are any causal 
relations between the two. This is easy to see once we step outside the domain of neural data, 
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since classifiers are frequently used on datasets that have no such causal relations among features 
and labels. SVMs can be used to parse handwritten ZIP codes on envelopes, or for image 
analysis and facial recognition. Success in these contexts implies nothing about causal structure 
in the target materials. Even within neuroscience, it is common to train classifiers on multimodal 
data sets (combining imaging, MEG/EEG, and other physiological or clinical biomarkers) that do 
not have a clear joint causal interpretation of their features (Meng et al., 2017; Woo, Chang, 
Lindquist, & Wager, 2017). 
Moreover, good predictors in machine learning tasks do not always overlap well with 
good targets of intervention (Athey, 2017). Consider a non-neural example. Marketing firms use 
machine learning tools to discover “high churn” customers—those that are likely to stop using a 
company’s products or services. But the population of customers who respond well to 
interventions such as marketing appeals only overlaps by 50% with those who are in the 
predictively isolated high-churn group. So we can often know that churn will take place in a 
certain population without being able to use that information to intervene causally on it. The 
same holds for many neurodiagnostic classifications. A classifier might use anatomical features 
such as hippocampal volume or the presence of amyloid plaques to diagnose Alzheimer’s 
disease, but neither of these is a cause of the disorder. Drugs targeting amyloid, in particular, 
have regularly failed to produce clinical improvements in DAT patients. Decoders in this case 
are not reliably tracking causes. This is a recurring problem across fields using similar classifier-
based analyses, such as genome-wide association studies: significant variables are often not 
predictive, and vice-versa (Lo, Chernoff, Zheng, & Lo, 2015). 
Indeed, decoders can just as easily operate in an anti-causal direction (Weichwald et al., 
2015). Consider two experimental designs, one in which a stimulus is presented followed by 
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BOLD imaging, and another in which BOLD imaging occurs prior to production of a behavioral 
or cognitive response. In a stimulus-first design, decoding the category of the stimulus operates 
against the direction of causation in the experiment. Clearly in this design we can’t treat 
decoders as causal models. But we cannot do so even in cases where the direction of decoding 
and the direction of causation are consistent. The reason is that decoding weights are not 
designed to be measures of causal contribution. As noted above, some factors may result in 
weights being assigned to features that are not causes of a phenomenon, such as incidentally 
correlated noise within voxels. Some actual causes may even receive low or zero weights simply 
because they are not most useful for decoding purposes in the context of the other voxel weight 
assignments.  
Neither can we generally regard classifiers as processing models. Decoding is typically 
presented as a way of extracting the information present in regional activation patterns. But 
within cognitive modeling, there is an important distinction between information and processes, 
as evinced by the fact that such models posit representation-process pairs that work together to 
execute cognitive functions. This is a fundamental commitment of cognitive modeling within the 
broadly Marrian tradition (Barsalou, 2017). Algorithmic cognitive models describe how 
representations are constructed, stored, and transformed in carrying out a cognitive operation. 
Task performance is a product of the joint operation of both factors (along with architectural 
facts such as resource constraints). The neural decodability of a distinction between two task 
conditions does not tell us whether this stems from representational differences, processing 
differences, or both. From the point of view of causal modeling, this simply amounts to 
conflating two potentially separate contributions. The sort of information that decoding provides, 
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then, does not inherently tell us about causal-explanatory structure, particularly as it relates to 
cognitive processing. 
 
5. Decoding as data exploration 
The problems surveyed here converge on the following conclusions. In terms of our 
original distinction, classifiers can be extraordinarily useful tools for predictive reverse 
inference. For functional reverse inference—the discovery not only of neural activity that is 
evidence for cognitive processing, but also of a prospective implementation theory for that 
processing—their utility is significantly less clear. The reason is that they are driven, in an 
unknown proportion of cases, by factors besides the ground truth concerning what patterns of 
neural activation are causally and explanatorily responsible for the cognitive processing we are 
investigating. Disentangling genuinely explanatory factors from the rest is difficult given that 
classifiers inherently conflate them. Decoding, in short, allows reverse inference of an often 
opaque kind that does not suit all of our investigative ends equally well.16 
In fact, MVPA itself is demonstrably not a panacea for the ills of localization-based 
reverse inference, since the same problem of multiple functional assignments can arise just as 
readily within it as in univariate analysis. To see this, consider a widely discussed study by 
Knops, Thiriel, Hubbard, Michel, and Dehaene (2009). In the first phase of their study they 
scanned participants during a random left/right eye movement task and trained a classifier on a 
group of six pre-selected cortical ROIs. This classifier could decode direction of motion with 
                                                          
16 To be clear, the preceding arguments are obviously not meant as blanket condemnations of the use of MVPA and 
machine learning in neuroscience. The issue concerns only whether the successful use of ML-based decoding 
methods is sufficient for making reverse inferences. 
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~70% accuracy across all participants. They then had the same participants perform a simple 
arithmetic task: either add or subtract two displayed numbers and choose the closest correct 
answer (out of seven choices). The classifier trained on activation patterns from the bilateral 
posterior superior parietal lobule (PSPL) was then applied, without alteration, to activation 
patterns in that region from the arithmetic task. The classifier succeeded ~55% of the time with 
addition mapped onto rightward eye motion and subtraction onto leftward motion (breakdown by 
condition was 61% correct for addition and 49% for subtraction).  
Knops et al. concluded from the fact that the same classifier achieved predictive success 
on both datasets that that the PSPL is involved in computations underlying both L/R eye motion 
and addition/subtraction. But now we face exactly the problem of multifunctional regions again. 
The information present in PSPL might indicate rightward eye motion or (some unknown 
cognitive component of) mental addition—or, for that matter, some more abstract but unknown 
operation that is implicated in both of them. We are not appreciably closer to understanding what 
“the” function of PSLP is, except to say that it contains information that can contribute to this 
pattern of discriminative success across tasks. The classifier transfer paradigm, then, is not in 
itself an advance in understanding the cognitive processing that goes on in particular brain 
regions. 
I should stress that this conclusion is one that del Pinal and Nathan might not object to. 
At one point they seem to reject the search for an explanatory implementation theory of the sort 
that functional RI is concerned with, arguing that rather than focusing on “how cognitive 
algorithms are neurally implemented”, reverse inference should address only the question of 
“which cognitive processes are more or less likely to be engaged in certain tasks whose nature is 
under dispute” (Nathan & Del Pinal, 2017, p. 9). This approach is quite consistent with the 
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predictive turn, although they don’t couch their claim in those terms. As Bzdok and Ionnadis 
note, “predictive approaches put less emphasis on mechanistic insight into the biological 
underpinnings of the coherent behavioral phenotype” (2019, p. 3). Shifting focus away from 
discovering the cognitive function of brain regions (or even distributed brain networks) is of a 
piece with this move from explanatory understanding towards successful prediction. 
Supposing, however, that neuroscientists wish to retain explanation as an epistemic goal, 
how can we reconceive the role of experimental practices such as MVPA, given that decoding 
models are not themselves explanatory? The rhetoric surrounding prediction depicts it as 
competing with explanation, or at least on the opposite side of a continuum from it (Bzdok & 
Yeo, 2017). I suggest, to the contrary, that we view decoding models not as competing for 
epistemic real estate with causal-explanatory ones, but as cooperating as part of a modeling 
pipeline. Decoding results constitute both heuristic input to explanatory models as well as 
constraints on them. 
Decoding is a useful heuristic insofar as it suggests a menu of possible sites for further 
investigation and intervention. For example, regions whose activity can be decoded to 
distinguish between presented visual objects can also be scrutinized for whether that activity 
predicts behavioral outcomes. But there is no guarantee that it will. In one such study, not all 
decodable information was behaviorally relevant—presentation of animate entities could be 
decoded throughout the ventral visual stream, but only a subset of these regions correlated with 
categorization reaction times (Grootswagers, Cichy, & Carlson, 2018). Alternatively, such 
regions can be probed using other methods to uncover their operations. For example, regions that 
support decoding of information might also exhibit repetition suppression for that same 
information (though see Ward, Chun, & Kuhl, 2013 for some doubts about this). 
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In a case where we know that decodable information can be correlated with behavioral or 
cognitive outcomes, we have the following constraint: for any region from which information 
can be read out, any account of that region’s function should explain how the region can 
contribute towards producing the behavior in question. That is, decoding results help to establish 
and clarify the explanandum phenomena that characterize the regions targeted by explanatory 
modeling. Something like this provides a useful way to understand Representational Similarity 
Analysis (RSA), a procedure of correlating the geometry of the space of stimuli (such as pictures 
of artifacts or faces) with that of the activation space of a collection of voxels (Kriegeskorte, 
2011; Kriegeskorte & Kievit, 2013). RSA returns a numerical measure (using, e.g., rank 
correlation) of the extent to which stimuli that are close together in visual similarity space remain 
so in activation space. As its name suggests, RSA is sometimes described as characterizing what 
a region represents. But as normally practiced it does not offer hypotheses about algorithmic-
level vehicles or processes. Rather, it articulates abstract structures of correspondence between 
regions and stimuli or behaviors. These correspondences, often discovered through decoding 
studies, can be regarded as tentative functional assignments. In this way they become part of the 
phenomena to be fed into the explanatory modeling pipeline. 
In short, the place of decoding models is not in competition with explanatory modeling, 
but prior to and in concert with it. This aligns with the guiding and constraining role that data 
modeling has often been assigned within a mechanistic framework (Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 
2005; but see Burnston, 2016b for an alternate interpretation). Imaging data is noisy and 
complex. Machine learning tools provide one way of extracting useful patterns from this data, 
which can help to stabilize new phenomena and discover new explanatory targets. This dovetails 
nicely with one of the original functions for which linear classifiers were developed, namely the 
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partitioning of large datasets according to the varieties of hidden information that they contain. 
As tools for simplifying and exploring neuroscientific datasets, they can contribute to 
explanatory modeling without displacing it. 
Finally, with respect to the question of reverse inference, the mere existence of decoding 
differences between task conditions does not establish differences in the underlying cognitive 
processes. What it does, however, is provide a set of phenomena to be investigated further; 
specifically, it suggests a plausible hypothesis about the structured information that is robustly 
detectable (in the brain at large, in an ROI, or within a cluster of searchlights) and that can be 
connected with measurable outcomes. If decoding results are stable across a wide range of 
models, parameter settings, and training regimes, and if they are systematically connectable with 
cognitive or behavioral outcomes, then the most predictive interpretable regions these 
converging models pick out are plausible targets for explanatory modeling. MVPA achieves the 
role of potential evidence for or against cognitive hypotheses by playing a supporting (though 
not individually sufficient) role in this sort of data modeling pipeline.17 
 
6. Conclusions 
I’ve argued that MVPA’s ability to make predictive inferences from activation patterns 
does not offer us a transparent interpretive window onto the ground truths that drive this success. 
                                                          
17 This point is similar to Kriegeskorte & Douglas’s (2019) warning against committing the single-model-
significance fallacy: that is, assuming that because a model explains some significant variance that it thereby 
captures facts about processing or causal structure. To reach such conclusions we need to integrate information from 
many models operating over a wide range of training data and parameter settings. This many-model integration 
process is what I have referred to here as a modeling pipeline. This notion is also discussed at length by Wright 
(2018), who emphasizes that in practice multiple analyses of data make distinct contributions to the characterization 
of phenomena in neuroimaging. 
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This form of predictive modeling is useful not because it can serve as a replacement for 
explanatory modeling, but because, seen in the proper perspective, it is an essential complement 
to it. Techniques from data science have their natural home in the analysis and modeling of data, 
even when deployed within neuroscience. To the extent that neuroscience continues to import 
and adapt machine learning tools, with their associated epistemic focus on prediction over 
explanation, there may be strong temptations to focus on the success of these tools without 
inquiring into the underlying causal-explanatory facts that enable them to succeed or fail. This 
temptation is understandable, given their striking translational successes, but I’ve argued that 
giving in to it would be a mistake. We should welcome the return of prediction as an important 
scientific desideratum without granting it dominance over our epistemic regime. 
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